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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
Amici represent the interests of legislators, doctors and patients in New Hampshire and 
throughout the nation.  Amici’s primary concern is with providing patients in the United States 
the best possible care through a socially and economically sustainable health system.  The 
trading of prescriber-identities in prescription records for use in drug marketing to physicians 
threatens this goal by facilitating highly individualized and coercive promotional environments 
that override physician autonomy and contribute to rising prescription drug spending.  Amici 
support the policy objectives of the New Hampshire Prescription Confidentiality Act, N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 318:47-f, in prohibiting such conduct and have a strong interest in defending its 
constitutionality. 
The National Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Prices (NLARx) is a 
nonpartisan, nonprofit organization of state legislators from across the country who advocate for 
lowering prescription drug costs and increasing access to affordable medicines. NLARx acts as a 
clearinghouse for legislation and information, assists state legislators and other policymakers in 
developing  appropriate prescription drug and related legislation, and works with academics, 
other policymakers and consumer organizations to support prescription-drug related policy 
efforts. The New Hampshire Legislature is a member of NLARx and Rep. Cindy Rosenwald, 
sponsor of HB 1346 which is challenged in this action, has been appointed by the Speaker of the 
New Hampshire House of Representatives to serve on the NLARx Board of Directors.  Bills 
similar to the New Hampshire statute at issue in this case were sponsored by NLARx members 
and are currently pending in member states West Virginia, Maine, Arizona and Hawaii.   
The New Hampshire Medical Society (NHMS) is the largest physician membership 
organization in New Hampshire.  Since 1791 NHMS has worked to promote the art and science 
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of medicine for the betterment of public health. The NHMS represents the concerns of all 
medical specialties and regions across the state as well as patient interests through advocacy, 
education and commonality.  NHMS supported HB 1346 in the New Hampshire Legislature, and 
its member physicians testified on the impact of identity data mining on physician privacy and 
prescribing patterns.  
Prescription Policy Choices (PPC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational and charitable 
organization which provides educational and research materials to state legislators, academics, 
policymakers, and the general public to assist them to reduce prescription drug prices and 
thereby increase access to affordable prescription drugs in the United States.  PPC’s primary 
focus is promoting and preserving innovative and effective policies aimed at reducing the cost of 
prescription drugs in the United States. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs in this case, IMS Health Inc. and Verispan, LLC, seek a preliminary injunction 
to prevent the enforcement of the New Hampshire Prescription Confidentiality Act, N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 318:47-f (“New Hampshire Act” or “Act”).  That Act protects consumers and the 
privacy interests of doctors by banning the increasingly common practice of using doctor-
identifying information in prescription records to facilitate targeting of pharmaceutical marketing 
and gifts toward doctors who prescribe the most expensive drugs for their patients.  This practice 
raises drug costs for all New Hampshire residents and compromises the professional autonomy 
of doctors. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court for the extraordinary relief of enjoining the enforcement of an 
Act, passed with nearly unanimous support in the New Hampshire Legislature and by the 
governor, absent any actual application of the Act against an infringing party.  This brief 
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addresses the failure of the plaintiffs to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of 
either their First Amendment or Commerce Clause claim.   
In regard to the First Amendment, plaintiffs assert a radical and unprecedented argument 
that heightened, even strict, scrutiny must be applied to every state regulation that has the effect 
of limiting the sales of information products between private contracting parties.  The Supreme 
Court has never held that the regulation of any information exchanged between contracting 
parties for commercial purposes is subject to First Amendment scrutiny, rather than the lenient 
rational-basis Due Process standard that has been applied to social and economic regulation since 
the downfall of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502, 537 (1934) (“[T]here can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate 
measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects.”).  Indeed, the most recent 
Supreme Court case to address a law restricting the use of the content of a record for secondary 
purposes instructed that such laws are “a regulation of conduct,” not of speech.  Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 513, 526-27 (2001).  The plaintiffs’ argument would revive Lochner’s ghost, 
forcing courts to apply heightened scrutiny to interrogate the means and ends of every regulation 
of contract, antitrust conspiracy, confidentiality protection, corporate reporting, consumer 
product safety labeling, and other regulation of business practices that involve exchanges of data 
or information between private parties.  The Supreme Court has admonished against such 
“reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for reviewing economic regulations.” Glickman v. 
Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476 (1997); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 591, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning against 
using the commercial speech doctrine “to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such as 
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Lochner” to strike economic regulations “based on the Court’s own notions of the most 
appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies”). 
Should this Court find that the First Amendment is applicable to New Hampshire’s 
regulation, then the most lenient standard of First Amendment review should be applied, i.e. that 
reserved for “speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business 
audience.”  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).  
Under this deferential standard, the Act must be upheld if it is reasonably tailored to a substantial 
government interest.  The Act undoubtedly meets this standard.  It directly and narrowly serves 
the substantial interests of the state assuring the health and welfare of its citizens and reducing 
costs that must be borne by the state, by protecting doctors (and thus their patients) from 
inappropriate individualized targeting.  And it does so without burdening the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to craft and deliver any message they wish to inform doctors and 
patients about their products.   
Plaintiffs also urge this court to accept an expansive and radical view of the deregulatory 
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, claiming that the Clause’s infamous “great silences”1 
may be used as a basis to strike down, on a facial challenge, legislation which unquestionably 
can be applied to in-state conduct and interpreted to regulate transactions that take place with 
persons in New Hampshire.  Because plaintiffs cannot show that every instance of the Act 
necessarily regulates commercial activity undertaken wholly outside of the State of New 
Hampshire, their facial challenge must fail. 
                                          
1 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-535 (1949); cf. Wardair Canada Inc. v. 
Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment) (referring to “the cloudy waters of this Courts’ dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine”). 
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This brief adopts, and thus does not repeat, the State of New Hampshire’s response to the 
Plaintiffs’ third argument – that the detailed and well-defined terms of the Act are 
unconstitutionally vague.  
BACKGROUND 
Nearly a third of the five-fold increase in U.S. spending on drugs over the last decade can 
be attributed to the increased efficacy of pharmaceutical marketing efforts that shift doctors’ 
prescribing from existing, effective, and lower cost (often generic) therapies to new and more 
expensive treatments.2  In 2004, the industry spent $27 billion on drug marketing (more than any 
other sector in the U.S. on its sales force or media advertising),3 over 85 percent of which was 
targeted at doctors.4   
Direct marketing of drugs to doctors through sales representatives, called “detailers,” has 
been a staple of pharmaceutical marketing practices since the mid-nineteenth century.5  But the 
practice of detailing has changed radically over the last decade (paralleling the propulsion of the 
industry to the position of the most profitable in the world, with the ten largest pharmaceutical 
companies garnering profits equivalent to the other 490 Fortune 500 companies combined).6 
Coincident with the rise of physician identity data mining, the pharmaceutical industry increased 
                                          
2 National Institute for Health Care Management (NIHCM), Prescription Drug Expenditures in 
2001: Another Year of Escalating Costs, 2-3 (revised May 6, 2002). 
3 Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Hokna, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: The Effects and 
Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 
Yale J. of Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 785, 785 (2005). 
4 Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace, 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec1.cfm, exhibit 1.20 (2005).  
5 Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, Atlantic Monthly (April 2006), available at 
www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200604/drug-reps. 
6 Public Citizen Congress Watch, Drug Industry Profits: Hefty Pharmaceutical Company 
Margins Dwarf Other Industries (June 2003). 
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its spending on direct marketing to doctors by more than 275 percent7 and doubled its sales force 
to over 90,000 drug representatives.8  There is now a pharmaceutical sales representative for 
every five office-based physicians in the United States.9   
Physician identity data mining began in the late 1980s and became a common component 
of pharmaceutical marketing tactics by the mid-1990s.  The practice began with IMS Health Inc., 
and other pharmaceutical marketing firms, collecting prescription data from pharmacies and 
other intermediaries in the prescription processing chain and selling it to pharmaceutical 
companies in increasingly sophisticated formats.  The practice was dramatically facilitated by 
automation of prescription processing by pharmacy benefit managers and other intermediaries, 
who were then in a position to sell the information to third parties.10 The data miners also spend 
tens of millions of dollars a year leasing the “physician masterfile” from the American Medical 
Association, which allows matching of physician identities to Drug Enforcement Agency 
numbers for each physician included on every prescription.  This information is compiled into 
proprietary databases and sold to pharmaceutical companies, who use the databases to provide 
their sales force with up-to-the minute information on the prescribing behaviors of every doctor 
in a given sales territory.11 
                                          
7 Kaiser, Trends and Indicators, exhibit 1.20.  
8 Manchanda & Hokna, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost, 5 Yale J. of Health Pol’y L. & 
Ethics at 788. 
9 Center for Policy Alternatives, Prescription Drug Marketing, 
www.stateaction.org/issues.cfm/issue/prescriptiondrugmarketing.xml 
10 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, HCFA Study of the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management 
Industry, HCFA Contract No. 500-97-0399/0097, 5 (June 2001) (describing rapid growth of 
PBM industry in 1990s). 
11 See Leg. Hist. at 94-97 (Liz Kowalczyk, Drug Companies’ Secret Reports Outrage Doctors, 
The Boston Globe, A1 (May 25, 2003)); id. at 104-114 (Emily Clayton, ‘Tis Always the Season 
for Giving: A White Paper on the Practice and Problems of Pharmaceutical Detailing, 
CALPIRG (September 2004)); see also Jake Whitney, Big (Brother) Pharma: How Drug Reps 
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Physician identity data mining facilitates coercive pharmaceutical marketing efforts in 
several key ways.  First, armed with data about prescribing habits, the sales representatives focus 
their resources on high volume prescribers, brand-loyal doctors, “cowboys” who are the first to 
prescribe new medicines, and doctors who have recently switched away from the brand or 
otherwise changed their prescribing behavior in a way that makes them look susceptible to a 
sales call.12   
Second, they use the information to target and tailor rewards to their best-prescribing 
“customers,” thus heightening the quid pro quo attributes of drug representative gift-giving.  
While low-value targets receive the routine gifts – small meals, pens, notepads, etc. – the high 
value targets can receive weekly, even daily, meals for their entire staff, luxury vacations in the 
guise of educational seminars, and can earn thousands – even hundreds of thousands – of dollars 
a year as speakers and “consultants” on drug company junkets.13   
Third, monitoring of prescribing practices also allows the sales representative to assess 
the impact of various gifts and messages on a particular physician to help them select the most 
                                                                                                                                        
Know Which Doctors to Target, The New Republic, TNR Online, 
www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060828&s=whitney082906 (August 29, 2006); Elliott, The Drug 
Pushers, supra; Robert Steinbrook, For Sale: Physicians’ Prescribing Data, 354 New Eng. J. 
Med. 2745 (2006); Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object to Gathering of Drug Data, N.Y. Times 
(May 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/business/04prescribe.html?ex=1304395200&en=bf193ef7c
92f2476&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss;  Shannon Brownlee & Jeanne Lenzer, Spin 
Doctored: How Drug Companies Keep Tabs on Physicians, Slate (May 31, 2005), available at 
www.slate.com/id/2119712/ 
12 See Saul, Doctors Object, supra at * 2; Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *7. 
13 See Leg. Hist. at 108-109 (Clayton, ‘Tis Always the Season for Giving) (describing “five and 
even six figure checks” given to doctors to induce prescription writing); Elliott, The Drug 
Pushers, supra at *7-8.; Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as the Pitch, N.Y. Times 
(July 28, 2006), available at 
www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/business/28lunch.html?ex=1311739200&en=704a144090f77cda
&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss: Whitney, Big (Brother) Pharma, supra at *2.  
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effective set of rewards.  A doctor who did not respond to a meal for the staff may next time 
receive an invitation to a steak dinner or a ball game; the doctor that did not respond to the 
flirtatious former cheerleader may next time receive a solicitation from a representative with a 
science background and a briefcase full of studies.14  
Fourth, doctors are informed that they are being monitored – through messages of 
appreciation for writing prescriptions,15 or messages of disappointment that they are not 
prescribing what was implicitly promised.16  This awareness of being monitored (and the 
pressure to conform thereby exerted) is internalized by physicians as each prescription is written 
with knowledge that the action is subject to the watchful eye of the drug representative.17 
The combination of identity data mining and targeted detailing is extremely effective at 
prompting physicians to alter their prescribing behavior, often in ways that have no or negative 
therapeutic benefit to the patient while raising drug costs.  Numerous studies demonstrate that 
“[p]hysicians’ use of targeted prescriptions increases substantially after visits with sales 
                                          
14 See Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *7-8; Leg. Hist at 95-96 (Kowalczyk, Drug 
Companies’ Secret Reports). 
15 See Saul, Doctors Object, supra (reporting that “Dr. Brad Wexler . . . was surprised four years 
ago when pharmaceutical representatives began thanking him for writing prescriptions – the first 
time he realized that the drug representatives had information he assumed was private”). 
16 See Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *7 (reporting that with data mining reports “drug reps 
could detect deception immediately”); Leg. Hist. at 33 (Testimony of Ms. Finocchiaro, Director 
of Cholesterol Management Center, Catholic Medical Center) (describing sales representative 
promise of breakfast for staff every week if she will “write me two prescriptions every week,” 
which the sales representative checked through mining data and returned complaining that “you 
didn’t write my two prescriptions”). 
17 Cf. Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in Power/Knowledge (1974) (discussing the exertion 
of power over individual behavior through a “system of surveillance,” an “inspecting gaze, a 
gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorisation to the point that he is his 
own overseer”); Tal Z. Zarsky, Mine your Own Business!: Making the Case for the Implications 
of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 Y. J. L. & Tech. 
1, 38-40 (2003) (discussing potential for an “autonomy trap” created by the use of data mining to 
alter preferences of targeted purchasers). 
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representatives.”18  Other studies show that the industry investments of tens of billions of dollars 
every year on direct marketing of drugs to doctors yield returns of over $10 for every dollar 
spent.19  
Sellers of more cost-effective drugs with lower profit margins often have no incentive to 
undertake the large investment necessary for physician marketing, and therefore the practice of 
detailing is highly biased in favor of promoting the most expensive products.20  One study 
showed, for example, that marketing branded calcium channel blockers for high blood pressure 
treatment instead of the less expensive therapies recommended by national treatment guidelines 
increased U.S. health expenditures by $3 billion in 1996 alone.21  
It is in this context that New Hampshire passed the Prescription Confidentiality Act, 
which regulates only the conduct of how prescription data is sold and used.  The Act requires 
                                          
18 Declaration of Avorn and Kesselheim at 6 (citing N Lurie, E.C. Rich, D.E. Simpson, et. al., 
Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers, 5 J. Gen. Intern. Med. 240-43 
(1990).  See also Declaration of Jerry Avorn, M.D. and Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D., J.D., pp. 3-5 
(discussing studies demonstrating the “powerful effect [of gifts and detailing] on driving drug 
utilization”); Abigail Caplovitz, Turning Medicine Into Snake Oil: How Pharmaceutical 
Marketers Put Patients at Risk, NJPIRG Law and Policy Center, 5 (2006) (reviewing studies); 
Manchanda & Hokna, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 
at 797-808 (reviewing studies).  See, e.g. H. Prosser, S. Almond & T. Walley, Influences on GPs 
Decisions to Prescribe New Drugs – the Importance of Who Says What, 20 Family Practice 61 
(2003); Dana J, Loewenstein G. A social science perspective on gifts to physicians from industry, 
290 JAMA 252 (2003). 
19 Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *1. 
20 See Declaration of Avorn and Kesselheim at 6 (noting that “[t]here is virtually no economic 
incentive for the manufacturers of generic drugs to send sales representatives”); Caplovitz, 
Turning Medicine Into Snake Oil, supra (discussing incentives and practices of sales 
representatives misrepresenting therapeutic value and indications for medicines to increase 
sales).  
21 Declaration of Avorn & Kesselheim at 7, discussing Cardarelli R, Licciardone JC, Taylor LG, 
A cross-sectional evidence-based review of pharmaceutical promotional marketing brochures 
and their underlying studies: Is what they tell us important and true? 7 BMC Fam Pract 13 
(2006).  Cf. Leg. Hist. at 14 (testimony that the least and most expensive calcium channel 
blocker on the New Hampshire Medicaid formulary is $13.50 vs. $87.30 per month 
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that certain persons in custody of prescription records keep individualized patient and prescriber 
information in the records confidential, so that it cannot be used to facilitate inappropriate 
targeting for pharmaceutical marketing.   
ARGUMENT 
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may be granted only by a 
clear demonstration by a plaintiff of the merits of such a request.”  13 Moore's Fed. Prac. § 
65.20, at 65-29 (3d ed.1998) (footnotes omitted).  To succeed in their effort to enjoin the 
enforcement of the New Hampshire Act, plaintiffs must show that: (1) they are likely to succeed 
on the merits; (2) absent the injunction they will suffer irreparable harm; (3) their injury 
outweighs any harm the granting of the injunction would inflict upon the State; and (4) the public 
interest will not be adversely affected by the injunction.  Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 
F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  This brief focuses on the first prong of the 
analysis: whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment and 
Commerce Clause Claims.   
I. THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL SUCCEED ON 
THE MERITS. 
In this case, the plaintiffs’ burden is especially high because they seek to enjoin the Act 
on a facial challenge, before it is ever enforced.  In part to protect the safeguards inherent in the 
adversarial system, the facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, 
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would 
be valid.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
                                                                                                                                        
respectively).  
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A. The Act Does Not Regulate Speech Protected by the First Amendment.  
Plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin enforcement of the New Hampshire Act on First Amendment 
grounds must be rejected because the Act regulates only the commercialization of prescription 
drug records, not any “speech” protected by the First Amendment.   
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, limits 
the abilities of states to regulate speech, not conduct.  “[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment 
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct 
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 
1297, 1308 (2006) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).  
The New Hampshire Act regulates only certain conduct performed with prescription 
records by those that come into their possession in the course of their business.  Specifically, it 
states that records containing patient- or prescriber-identifiable data “shall not be licensed, 
transferred, used, or sold . . . for any commercial purpose” not related to the filling of the 
prescription or obtaining reimbursement for it.  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318:47-f.  By narrowly 
restraining the use of prescription records, the New Hampshire Act is substantively similar to the 
aspects of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 approved of by the Supreme 
Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 513 (2001).  
In Bartnicki, the Court struck down a section of the statute that constituted a “naked 
prohibition against disclosures” of information obtained through a wiretap, but approved of the 
section of the law that penalized any person who “uses . . . the contents of” a wiretapped 
communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d).  The court recognized cases holding that the use 
prohibition made it unlawful to “use an illegally intercepted communication . . . to create a 
competing product,” “in trading in securities,” “to prepare strategy for contract negotiations,” or 
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“to discipline a subordinate.”  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 n.10.  These prohibitions did not 
implicate the First Amendment, the Court explained, because “the prohibition against the ‘use’ 
of the contents of an illegal intraception” is “a regulation of conduct.” 532 U.S. at 526-27. 
 Like the section of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act approved of by the court 
in Bartnicki, the New Hampshire Act regulates certain uses of the content of a record and 
thereby regulates conduct, not speech.  The Act is substantially similar to the many “secondary 
use” regulations that inhibit information provided for one purpose from being used for other 
purposes, which are “unproblematic from a First Amendment perspective.”  Neil M. Richards, 
Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149, 1190 (2005).  
Federal and state laws contain numerous secondary use regulations that are similar in 
nature to the New Hampshire Act.  For example, federal law: prohibits information furnished to 
the Census from being “used to the detriment of any respondent,” 13 U.S.C. §8(c); prohibits 
release of individually identifiable health information, Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936;  prohibits disclosures of 
“personally identifiable information concerning any consumer” of a video rental establishment, 
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2710-2711, or of a cable operator, Cable 
Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §551(c)(1); requires that internet service providers “not 
knowingly divulge” subscriber information and communications except for certain public 
purposes, 18 U.S.C.A. §2702; and requires states to limit the disclosure of drivers’ personal 
identifying information without their consent, Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2721-25.   See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
as valid regulation of commerce).  Similarly, states: prohibit divulging, publishing or receiving 
social security numbers in certain forms, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.85(a); regulate the use and 
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disclosure of information “obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record,” Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 4501.27(A); require that a news-gathering organization “shall not use or distribute” accident 
reports “for a commercial purpose other than the news-gathering organization's publication or 
broadcasting of the information,” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.635, see Amelkin v. McClure, 330 F.3d 
822, 827 (2003) (holding that § 189.635 “does not restrict or even regulate expression”); and 
declare that “prescription records, physician orders and other records related to any patient care 
or medical condition(s) of a patient that are maintained by a pharmacy . . . shall be considered 
confidential,” 20 Mo. Code of State Regulations 2220-2.  Such laws regulate the use of data and 
other information and thus constitute “a regulation of conduct,” not speech.  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 
at 526-27.  This is true without regard to how much more (or less) speech might occur if the uses 
of the data were not regulated.  Otherwise, Bartnicki could not have held as it did. 
The Act does not restrict corporations from advertising to customers or doctors, or 
otherwise selecting and transmitting sales messages that would fall within the definition of 
“commercial speech”.  See Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476 
(1997) (holding “the standard appropriate for the review of economic regulation,” not the First 
Amendment, applicable where there is “no restraint on the freedom of any producer to 
communicate any message to any audience”).22  Under the Act, there is no limit on any 
prescribing pharmaceutical company’s ability to communicate “vital information about the 
market” through “accurate information about the availability of goods and services.” 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-96 (1996).  Unlike the state regulations in 
any of the Supreme Court cases involving unconstitutional regulations of advertising, the Act 
does not ban any industry from engaging in commercial advertising, cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & 
                                          
22 Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 n.8 (“We do not hold [that a credit report is] 
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Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down ban on 
promotional advertising by electric utilities), does not limit the substance of messages that may 
be disseminated, cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 495-96 (striking down ban on 
advertisement of liquor prices), and does not limit the forums available for commercial 
advertising, cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking down ban 
on certain outdoor advertising display signs); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 
410 (1993) (striking down ban of commercial handbills on public property); Edenfield v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761 (1993) (striking down ban on in-person solicitation by certified public 
accountants).  Rather, the Act simply prevents companies from using prescribing data to target 
doctors to receive commercial speech. 
At bottom, this Court is reviewing one of the “[n]umerous examples” where the 
regulation of exchanges of information between private firms does not trigger First Amendment 
scrutiny.  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).  See id. (noting the lack of 
First Amendment scrutiny for regulation of “the exchange of information about securities, 
corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information among 
competitors, and employers’ threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees”) 
(citations omitted).23  Accordingly, the Act “is a species of economic regulation that should 
                                                                                                                                        
commercial speech”). 
23 See also Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 
56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1181, 1183-84 (1988) (noting “a vast range” of exchanges of information 
between companies the regulation of which does not implicate the First Amendment, including 
“communications to offerees, stockholders, and investors now regulated by various state and 
federal securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934; numerous communications among business executives about prices and business practices 
now regulated by the Sherman Antitrust Act; communications about working conditions and the 
like now regulated by the National Labor Relations Act; representations about products and 
services now regulated by the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug 
Administration; representations about products now regulated by various consumer protection 
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enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that [the court must] accord to other policy 
judgments made by [a state].”  Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477.  
The plaintiffs do not argue that the New Hampshire Act lacks a rational basis and do not 
contend that the law cannot survive the deferential scrutiny reserved for constitutional review of 
economic regulations.  See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  Accordingly, they have failed to 
show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive challenge to the means and 
ends of the Act.  
B. If the First Amendment Were to Apply, the Act Would Nevertheless be a 
Valid Regulation of Commercial Speech.  
Assuming arguendo that the Court finds that the New Hampshire Act is a regulation of 
speech protected by the First Amendment, the plaintiffs have nonetheless failed to show that the 
Act is unconstitutional under what would be the applicable (and most lenient) standard of First 
Amendment review.  
The Supreme Court has instructed that commercial speech must be afforded First 
Amendment protection “commensurate with its position in relation to other constitutionally 
protected expression.”  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).  Thus blanket 
bans on commercial advertising to the general public, which “not only hinder consumer choice, 
but also impede debate over central issues of public policy,” 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 
503, are subject to more exacting scrutiny and “rarely survive constitutional review.”  Id. at 504; 
                                                                                                                                        
laws, by the Uniform Commercial Code, and by the common law of warranty and contract; 
statements about willingness to enter into a contract now regulated by the common law of 
contract; and so on and on”) (internal citations omitted); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status 
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA Law. Rev. 1, 20-25 (2000) (listing examples); Frederick 
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional 
Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1777-787 (2004) (same). 
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see id   at 505, 507 (requiring that the law banning all price advertising by liquor sellers 
“significantly” advance a substantial state interest and be “no more extensive than necessary”).  
Where the state restricts one type of advertising to the public, e.g. in-person solicitations, but 
leaves other channels of communication available, a less strict form of constitutional scrutiny has 
been applied.  See Edenfield, 507 U.S. 767 (explaining that ban on in-person solicitation by 
public accountants “need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state 
interest”).  Finally, in a related context, the Court has explained that the least demanding form of 
constitutional protection is warranted for “speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker 
and its specific business audience.”  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that credit report delivered to five business subscribers was 
entitled to “reduced constitutional protection” and could be subject to state defamation damages 
without showing of actual malice).   
The New Hampshire Act does not ban all pharmaceutical advertising, or even one type of 
such advertising (e.g. in-person solicitations), and therefore, as we argue above, the commercial 
speech doctrine is inapplicable.  If it is applied, it is clear that its most deferential form must be 
used.  Thus, citing Dun & Bradstreet, the D.C. Circuit held that “targeted marketing lists” sold to 
clients by credit reporting agencies “are private speech warranting only qualified constitutional 
protection.”  Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).  The D.C. Circuit therefore applied a deferential form of intermediate scrutiny to the 
FTC’s regulation of the sale of the marketing lists, upholding their use despite arguments that it 
was possible to meet the ends of the legislation in a manner less invasive to the regulated 
corporations’ interests.  See id. at 1143 (holding that the First Amendment “does not obligate 
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courts to invalidate a remedial scheme because some alternative solution is marginally less 
intrusive”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The New Hampshire Act was designed to serve two related goals: (1) to protect the 
privacy interests of patients and doctors in prescription records; and (2) to save the state, 
consumers and businesses money on prescription drug spending.24  The Act substantially 
advances each goal without unduly limiting First Amendment protected speech, and thereby 
survives constitutional scrutiny.  
The Act’s relation to the legitimate state interest in controlling drug prices and promoting 
public health objectives is well canvassed by the amicus brief of AARP et. al. and Amici adopt 
those arguments in total.  In addition, it is important to acknowledge the second objective of the 
Act implicated by this suit – protecting the privacy interests of doctors and the records they 
create when they write prescriptions.25  As in Trans Union Corp., this interest is directly 
advanced by the Act because “the government cannot promote its interest (protection of personal 
financial data) except by regulating speech because the speech itself (disseminating of financial 
data) causes the very harm the government seeks to prevent.”  267 F.3d at 1142. 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have frequently recognized that governments have a 
legitimate interest in protecting individuals against particularly invasive and coercive solicitation 
practices.  See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995) (recognizing 
substantial interest in protecting privacy of personal injury victims by prohibiting solicitation by 
lawyers); Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 
2004) (recognizing substantial government interest in preventing “coercive sales practices”); Van 
                                          
24 See Leg. Hist. at 9-11 (statement of Representative Rosenwald). 
25 Plaintiffs do not challenge the State’s interests in protecting the privacy interests of patients.  
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Bergen v. State of Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1555 (8th Cir.1995) (recognizing substantial 
interest, motivated by protecting consumer privacy, in limiting use of unsolicited sales calls by 
auto-dialing/announcing devices); Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 
1514-15 (10th Cir.1994) (recognizing substantial interest in protecting privacy of persons 
charged with misdemeanor traffic offenses and DUI).   
Plaintiffs do not challenge patients’ interests in not being targeted for direct-to-consumer 
advertising based on prescription data monitoring.  Rather, they suggest that there is no 
substantial interest in protecting doctors from targeted advertising.  But even if doctors’ interests 
in being free from such targeting were not alone sufficient, with prescription medications doctors 
act as patients’ agents.  With medicines, it is the doctors, not the patients, who decide what 
medicines to prescribe and therefore make the choices about what medicines will be consumed. 
As Director of Pharmacy Services at New Hampshire Community Hospital explained to the New 
Hampshire Legislature:  
Writing a prescription is unlike any other form of purchase.  A 
physician makes a decision that not only influences, but 
“prescribes” what his patient needs to purchase.  Think of the 
financial stability that General Motors would experience if one 
person could decide which cars others must purchase! 
Leg. Hist. at 62.  
It is because doctors prescribe patients’ pharmaceutical consumption choices that doctors 
are the target of over 85 percent of all marketing expenditures by pharmaceutical companies and 
are thus most likely to be subjected to harassing solicitations facilitated by commercial trading of 
prescription data.  As with consumers in other contexts, New Hampshire has a substantial 
interest in protecting the privacy and autonomy interests of doctors in not being subjected to 
coercive marketing practices based on the release and monitoring of their prescribing behavior. 
 {C0258963.1 } 19
The New Hampshire Act is narrowly tailored to restrict no more speech than necessary to 
meet its goals – indeed, it restricts no speech at all.  The Act does not regulate the practice of 
pharmaceutical detailing in New Hampshire, which is undoubtedly commercial speech afforded 
some measure of protection under the First Amendment.  Nor does it prohibit the use or sale of 
prescription information coded by geographical area or other format that does not divulge the 
identity of individual prescribers, as is the common practice in Europe, Canada and much of the 
rest of the world.26  In this way, is it a narrowly tailored to prevent the data from being used to 
facilitate the most abusive practices in pharmaceutical marketing. 
C. Plaintiffs are not Likely to Succeed on their Facial Challenge Based on 
the Commerce Clause. 
Plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin enforcement of the New Hampshire Act based on the 
argument that it may be applied to commerce taking place wholly outside of the state must be 
rejected because they fail to establish “that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act 
would be valid.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.   
The plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause argument is based on the Supreme Court’s line of cases 
holding that the “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce 
that takes place wholly outside of the State’s Borders.”  Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
642-43 (1982).  Under this doctrine, the Court struck down an Illinois “blue sky” law that 
regulated corporate takeovers “which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder,” id. at 642, 
as well as price affirmation statutes (requiring prices in one state to be no higher than in another 
state) the necessary effect of which was to control product prices outside of the regulating state.  
                                          
26 See Steve Niles, No Way to Fill in the Blanks, 25 Euromoney Institutional Investor 1 (May 1, 
2006) (noting that “in Europe, Canada, and many other parts of the world” prescription data is 
available only in a “brick” – “a statistical group put together in such a way that you’re not 
supposed to be able to work out which doctor is writing what”). 
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See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1989) (explaining that “the interaction of the 
Connecticut affirmation statute with the Massachusetts beer-pricing statute . . . has the practical 
effect of controlling Massachusetts prices”).  The Commerce Clause does not, however, ban all 
state regulation that reaches out-of-state parties doing in-state business.  A state law may reach 
out-of-state conduct where the regulated transactions “wind up within their borders,” K-S 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prod., Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1992); see also PhRMA 
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge based on allegation 
that “Maine’s regulation of the terms of transactions that occur elsewhere”); In re Brand Name 
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 612 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding application of 
state price fixing prohibition to an interstate scheme of manufacturers and wholesalers even 
though “it is doubtful that any of the price-fixed sales attacked in the suit took place in intrastate 
rather than interstate commerce”) or otherwise involve an in-state party, Goldmen & Co., Inc. v. 
New Jersey Bureau of Securities, 163 F.3d 780, 787 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“contracts formed between 
citizens in different states implicate the regulatory interests of both states”).  
It is not disputed that sales and transfers of prescriber-identified prescription drug records 
take place in New Hampshire, “wind up within” New Hampshire, K-S Pharmacies, 962 F.2d       
at 731, or otherwise involve New Hampshire contracting parties, Goldmen, 163 F.3d at 787.  
Accordingly, the Act is clearly constitutional in at least some of its applications and therefore the 
plaintiffs cannot show they are likely to prevail on a facial Commerce Clause claim. 
Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their Commerce Clause challenge based solely on their 
argument that ambiguous language in the Act could be interpreted to apply to out-of-state 
conduct.  Plaintiffs base their claim in large part on the argument that the ban on certain sales or 
transfers of “records relative to prescriber identifiable data” is not explicitly restricted to sales or 
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transfers of records in or from New Hampshire.  Plaintiffs’ Brief at 59.  A similar claim was 
rejected by the 7th Circuit in K-S Pharmacies, 962 F.2d at 730-31.  There, the plaintiffs argued 
that a statute violated the Commerce Clause by banning pharmaceutical prices in Wisconsin 
higher than those given to its “most favored purchaser,” without specifying that the most favored 
purchaser must also be in Wisconsin.  The Court rejected the challenge, explaining that “[i]t is all 
but certain that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, if given the chance, would interpret ‘most 
favored purchaser’ to mean ‘most favored purchaser in Wisconsin’” to “conform the legislation 
to the limits of state power.”  Id.27  New Hampshire courts can be similarly expected to conform 
the language of the Act to the limits of its power. 
Finally, the degree to which any particular enforcement of the Act may transgress the 
State’s authority under the Commerce Clause is not appropriate to review on a facial challenge.  
Determining the scope of the in-state nexus in a particular transaction is a highly fact-intensive 
process that is not appropriate for summary resolution absent an actual enforcement of the Act.  
See Country Classic Dairies v. Milk Control Bureau, 847 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1988) (remanding 
commerce clause claim for trial to develop facts “detailing each step in the interstate 
commerce”); Farmland Dairies v. McGuire, 789 F. Supp. 1243, 1255-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(denying summary judgment on Commerce Clause challenge to New York regulation of milk 
claimed to be destined for New Jersey); Mississippi ex. rel. Patterson v. Pure Vac Dairy Prod. 
Corp., 251 Miss. 457, 469 (1964) (applying Mississippi law to out-of-state contract found to be a 
“fiction of duality” erected to evade Mississippi regulation). 
                                          
27 Cf. Taylor v. Rodale, Inc. 2004 WL 1196145, *2 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (construing Pennsylvania law 
to avoid extraterritorial application); cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) 
(expressing “longstanding principle” that federal legislation is interpreted to “apply only within 
the jurisdiction of the United States”). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should be 
denied. 
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